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Mark Borgschulte and Yuci Chen
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n The share of young people out of
school and work (“the disconnection
rate”) rose from 13.4 percent in
February 2020 to a peak of 25.3
percent in April 2020, and has been
declining since that time.
n The pandemic drove some
individuals to disconnection,
regardless of whether they were
in school, at work, or already
disconnected, but full-time workers
saw the largest increase in transition
to disconnection.
n The increase in the disconnection
rate at the beginning of the pandemic
was mostly driven by a reduction in
full-time work (35 hours a week or
greater).
n School enrollment fell at the end
of 2020, suggesting that prospective
students didn’t enroll and/or current
students didn’t remain in school. The
drop in school enrollment contributed
to the overall persistence of the high
disconnection rate.
n Schools provided an alternative
option for young part-time workers,
as they became more likely to enroll in
school during the pandemic compared
to the prepandemic period.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/21-348.

A
t the beginning of 2020, a deadly new coronavirus known as COVID-19 began to
spread worldwide. Tis pandemic had a large negative impact on the economy and young
people in the United States, as businesses were shut down to contain the spread of the
virus and many schools moved to online learning. In this paper, we use data from the
Current Population Survey to estimate the impact of the COVID pandemic on the youth
labor market, with a focus on youth disconnection.
Te term “disconnected youth” refers to a group of young people who are not in
education or training programs, nor at work. In 2019, approximately four million young
adults aged 18 to 24 years in the United States, or 13.8 percent, were reported to be
neither in school nor at work, the lowest percentage in the past three decades. But the
pandemic increased the disconnection rate dramatically—from 13.4 percent in February
2020 to 25.3 percent in April 2020. And although, controlling for seasonality, the
disconnection rate began declining afer April, as of December 2020 the rate was still 3.7
percentage points higher than it had been in December 2019.
Te impact of the pandemic recession varied by what young people were doing prior
to the pandemic. Individuals who worked full time were hit hardest, as the spike in the
disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic was mostly driven by a reduction
in full-time work (35 hours a week or more). Compared to the developing period of
the Great Recession (2008–2010), when the unemployment rate increased dramatically,
the pandemic recession has had a deeper impact on full-time workers: we see a larger
increase in the transition from full-time work to disconnection during the pandemic.
Te share of young adults working part time, conditional on not being in school,
fell only slightly in April, then quickly rebounded to its original level. And while both
full-time and part-time workers became more likely to go back to school during the
pandemic compared to the prepandemic period, we observe a larger increase in the
transition from part-time work to school.
Taken in total, school enrollment rates barely changed at the start of the pandemic,
increased slightly during the summer, but started to fall toward the end of 2020. Tis
decline in the overall school enrollment rate among young people contributed to the
persistence of a high disconnection rate at the end of 2020. Perhaps most notably, we
observe that those starting out from a point of disconnection did not beneft from a
transition to the school system. Tis trend demonstrates another contrast to the 2007
recession and the recovery period that followed: between 2008 and 2010, we saw an
increase in the transition from all states (part-time employment, full-time employment,
school or training, and disconnection) to school, but this pattern has not yet been
observed during the pandemic recession.
Tere have also been disparate efects based on race and gender. At frst, the negative
impact of the pandemic was larger for minority groups aged 18–24, regardless of gender.
However, the gap between minority and white males has been closing, while the gap
between minority and white females persists.
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Figure 1 plots the seasonally adjusted impact of the pandemic. Te disconnection rate
increased in April 2020 by more than 10 percentage points and gradually fell aferward.
Ten, starting in October, it began to increase again slightly. Te higher disconnection
rate suggests that during the pandemic, a large proportion of young people were derailed
from their original plans and experienced difculty transitioning into the labor market.
To provide a more complete picture of the impact on young people, we examined the
changes in shares of young people in school and at work.
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Figure 1 Percentage of Young People neither in School nor at Work, 2020
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Compared to the
developing period of
the Great Recession
(2008-2010), when the
unemployment rate
increased dramatically,
the pandemic recession
has had a deeper impact
on full-time workers: we
see a larger increase in the
transition from full-time
work to disconnection.
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NOTE: This fgure shows the estimated impact of the pandemic on disconnection rate by month for the year 2020
for young people aged 18–24. In the estimation, we use data between 2015 and 2020 and control for seasonality
and annual trends.
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota.

On the next page, in Figure 2, Panel A plots the share of young people enrolled in
school or training programs. Previous research suggests that young people use school
options to shield themselves from bad labor market outcomes (Stange 2012). During the
pandemic recession, however, school rates barely changed, except for a temporary increase
during the summer months. In fact, school attendance started to fall afer September.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the trends in work categorized into part time (< 35 hours/
week) and full time (≥ 35 hours/week). Te share of young people who worked part
time remained stable. Specifcally, the percentage of youth engaged in part-time work
fell moderately in April, then gradually started to increase. Full-time work, however, did
not follow the same trend. Afer accounting for seasonality, we fnd that the percentage
of young people working full time dropped by 11.2 percentage points from February
to April—with the actual share dropping from 33 percent in February to 22 percent in
April—and that it stayed low during the summer and early fall. Taken as a whole, Figure
2 suggests that the increase in the disconnection rate at the beginning of the pandemic
was mostly driven by a reduction in full-time work, but that, toward the end of 2020, the
drop in school rates played an important role.

Transitions among Disconnection, School, Part-Time Work, and Full-Time Work

Table 1 shows how the impact of the pandemic varies by what a young person was
doing prior to the pandemic, revealing compositional changes that are not observed
2

POLICY BRIEF | APRIL 2021

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Figure 2 Percentage of Young People in School or at Work, 2020
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Panel A: School
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Panel B: Work

-.15

Te higher disconnection
rate suggests that during
the pandemic, a large
proportion of young
people were derailed from
their original plans and
experienced difculty
transitioning into the
labor market.
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NOTE: This fgure plots the impact of the pandemic on the share of young people (18–24) in school (Panel A)
or at work (Panel B) by month for the year 2020. For these two subfgures, we construct four mutually exclusive
states: 1) full-time work, 2) school, 3) part-time work, and 4) disconnection. In the case of ties, we use the
following ordering: full-time work > school > part-time work > disconnection.
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota.

in the aggregate trends. We consider fve mutually exclusive states: 1) disconnection,
2) school, 3) part-time work, 4) full-time work, and 5) not being interviewed in 2020
conditional on being interviewed in 2019. Panel A reports the one-year transition
probability, estimated using the prepandemic period (2018–2019), and Panel B reports
the impact of the pandemic (2019–2020).
3
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Full-time workers
experienced an increase
in the transition from
full-time work to parttime work, while parttime workers experienced
declines in transitioning
to both types of work.
Tis suggests that
although the share of
people working part-time
did not change much, the
composition did change.

Table 1 The Impact of the Pandemic on Young Workers Based on Their
Prepandemic State
Starting state

Disconn.
School
PT work
FT work

Disconn.
School
PT work
FT work

Disconn.
0.332
(0.013)
0.059
(0.004)
0.077
(0.010)
0.032
(0.003)

PT Work
0.057
(0.006)
0.049
(0.004)
0.203
(0.014)
0.036
(0.003)

End state
Panel A: 2018–2019
School
0.081
(0.007)
0.437
(0.009)
0.059
(0.008)
0.053
(0.004)

FT Work
0.120
(0.009)
0.144
(0.006)
0.293
(0.016)
0.480
(0.008)

Missing
0.410
(0.014)
0.311
(0.008)
0.368
(0.017)
0.399
(0.008)

Panel B: Impact of the Pandemic (2019–2020; percentage point/percent)
Disconn.
PT Work
School
FT Work
Missing
0.024
−0.010
−0.005
−0.011
0.002
7.4%
−17.6%
−6.2%
−9.4%
0.5%
0.019
−0.001
−0.003
−0.040
0.026
32.6%
−2.5%
−0.7%
−27.8%
8.4%
0.055
−0.026
0.061
−0.127
0.037
72.0%
−12.8%
102.4%
−43.3%
9.9%
0.039
0.008
0.008
−0.068
0.013
124.3%
21.0%
14.2%
−14.1%
3.3%

NOTE: Panel A shows the estimated transition probabilities using the 2018–2019 panel from the starting state,
represented by rows, to the destination state, represented by columns. The numbers show what percentage,
from among those individuals aged 18–24 who were in a given starting state, end up in each of the destination
states. The numbers in the same row add up to 1.000 by construction. The missing category includes those
respondents who were not reinterviewed and those respondents whose status was undetermined. Panel B
shows the change in the transition probabilities from the 2018–2019 panel to the 2019–2020 panel. In both
panels, we restrict the sample to those whose ffth-round interview was supposed to happen after April 2019
or April 2020 (and before December of each year). Percentage-point changes are reported in black, and percent
changes are in blue. Delta-method-calculated standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota.

Tough the nonresponse rate increased during the pandemic, we argue that the
impact will not be large, because if we distribute the percentage points to the nonmissing
states, the main observations that we discuss in this table do not change. With the caveat
of data attrition in mind, the results suggest that the pandemic drives a proportion of
individuals from all four starting states to disconnection. In percentage terms, fulltime workers saw the largest transition into disconnection: whereas only 3.2 percent
of individuals working full time in 2018 transitioned to disconnection in 2019, this
percentage more than doubled in the following year. Te impact of the pandemic on
those who were already in disconnection appears to have been small.
Full-time workers also experienced an increase in the transition from full-time work
to part-time work, while part-time workers experienced declines in transitioning to both
types of work. Tis observation suggests that although the share of people working part
time did not change much, the composition did change. Both types of workers became
more likely to return to school during the pandemic compared to the prepandemic
period, so school seemed to provide some level of protection for young workers. Tose
who started out from disconnection do not seem to have benefted from the school
system.
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Tough the disconnection
rate has been declining,
the reduction in full-time
work, the alternative
online instruction
arrangement, and
the nonresponsive or
even declining school
enrollment rate can, in the
long run, negatively afect
young people’s human
capital accumulations and
lifetime earnings.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

Conclusion

During the COVID-19 pandemic, more young people stayed disconnected from the
school system and the labor market. Tough the disconnection rate has been declining,
the reduction in full-time work, the alternative online instruction arrangement, and the
nonresponsive or even declining school enrollment rate can, in the long run, negatively
afect young people’s human capital accumulations and lifetime earnings. It is important,
therefore, to understand the needs of young people and formulate policies to support
these young people to help them succeed.
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